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Chief. “Sir,” he says, “I have got some good news and bad news.”
The Grand Chief asks for the good news ﬁrst and is told that the De
Beers has just discovered diamonds near Attawapiskat. The Grand
Chief is happy. He says, “Well, this is great. Hope for our youth. What
could the bad news possibly be,” he asks the Attawapiskat Chief. The
reply is, “The bad news is that De Beers have just discovered diamonds
near Attawapiskat.” (Peerla, 2005).*The paper was developed with guidance and support of Dr. Wiktor
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and the Northwest Territories. The work could not have been carried out
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Agricultural, Life & Environmental Sciences (Canada) and the Canada
Research Chair program. Particular thanks to the elders and communities
of Mikisew Cree First Nation and Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation for1. INTRODUCTION
Indigenous communities in many parts of the world are
socio-economically marginalized, a condition that has been
recognized by numerous international covenants and declara-
tions (Corntassel, 2012; Dahl, 2012; O’Faircheallaigh, 1998).
Such poverty appears most paradoxical in resource rich
regions of the world, including that of northern Alberta. Com-
munities in such resource rich regions would seem best situ-
ated for economic opportunity and ‘development’, when
compared to those in regions less well endowed. Evidence gar-
nered over the last 30 years, however, suggests the inverse.
Paradoxically, resource abundance, or economic dependence
on natural resources, is associated with slower economic
growth (Sachs & Warner, 2001). Although this pattern is most
evidenced in parts of Africa and Latin America, this paradox
of plenty has also been the subject of research in North Amer-
ica in the last decade (Kusel, 2001; Kwang-Koo, Marcouiller,
& Deller, 2005; Leake, Adamowicz, & Boxall, 2006; Machlis &
Force, 1988; Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2004; Stedman, Parkins, &
Beckley, 2005).
The resource curse is a problem most clearly deﬁned by
macroeconomic indicators such as inﬂation and national cur-
rency exchange rates (Sachs & Warner, 1995); however, its
causes and symptoms are more complex. This paper discusses
the resource curse theory and its applicability to a regional
natural resource development scenario. Given that both the
beneﬁts and costs of large-scale resource development are dif-
ferentially distributed, it would follow that some populations
and regional economies may be more sensitive to symptoms
and eﬀects of the resource curse than others (Langton &
Mazel, 2008). With this assumption in hand, the paper asks:425are Indigenous communities (First Nations and Me´tis) in
northern Alberta vulnerable to the symptoms of the resource
curse and what capacity do they have to address its eﬀects?
Answering these questions for this paper, required consider-
ation of the speciﬁc symptoms of the resource curse and their
signiﬁcance relative to the socio-economic histories and con-
temporary realities of Indigenous communities in Alberta,
Canada. Ultimately, the aim was to better understand how
First Nations and Me´tis communities can be better oﬀ as a
result of the unprecedented resource development boom
occurring in western Canada.2. SETTING AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The oil sands are a major source of unconventional oil
involving the mining and processing of bitumen (oil sands).
Canada hosts the only major oil sands mining industry in
the world; almost half of the country’s oil production comes
from such mining in northern Alberta. There are three major
bitumen deposits in northern Alberta – Athabasca, Cold Lake,
and the Peace. The largest is the Athabasca deposit, which is
located in the northeastern Alberta in the Regional Municipal-
ity of Wood Buﬀalo. Oil sands production from this area cur-
rently results in over two million barrels of oil per day.
Production is expected to increase in coming decades. The
provincial energy board, which regulates the industry, esti-
mates that production will total 3.8 million barrels per daytheir insights. Final revision accepted: March 21, 2015.
Figure 1. Oil sands regions of northern Alberta, Canada.
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2013).
The Athabasca oil sands have been in commercial produc-
tion since the late 1960s with the largest projects led by Sun-
cor, Syncrude and Shell Canada. Another nine projects were
in operation in 2013 with the total area under operation calcu-
lated at over 5,000 km2(see Figure 1).
The area known to petroleum producers as the Athabasca
Oil Sands, is part of the traditional territory of Dene and Cree
First Nations – Mikisew Cree First Nation (pop. 2592), Atha-
basca Chipewyan First Nation (pop. 905), Fort McKay First
Nation (pop. 668), Fort McMurray First Nation (pop. 621)
and Chipewyan Prairie (pop. 718). While First Nations’
reserves and Me´tis settlement areas comprise just over 5% of
the land area, a much larger proportion of the land in the
region was and continues to be used and occupied by First
Nations and Me´tis peoples (Government of Alberta, 2013).
The boreal ecosystem of the Athabasca oil sands continues
to be the socio-economic basis of subsistence and livelihood
for these First Nations communities, as well as the foundation
of cultural traditions and spiritual beliefs (Carter, 1999). How-
ever, oil sands mining has restricted their access to these land
and resources. Industrial land leases surround most Aborigi-
nal communities in the oil sands region, making it unsafe
and diﬃcult for harvesters to use those areas. Such leases cre-
ate both physical and institutional barriers to resource prac-
tices such as hunting, ﬁshing, and trapping, as well as plant
harvesting. Little has been done to recover these areas; byone government estimate, less than 1% of the roughly
50,000 km2 mined by the largest leaseholders has been
reclaimed (Government of Alberta, 2008).
Much of the debate about the impact and beneﬁt of oil
sands development in northern Alberta has rested upon its
ecological eﬀects.
As Alberta’s economy has grown so has ecological degradation in the
form of habitat loss, landscape fragmentation, pollution levels, species
endangerment, etc. The major disturbances of oil and gas, forestry,
and agriculture interact in complex ways; some of these disturbances
are increasing exponentially (e.g., clear cut logging), may double soon
or are widespread but little studied (Timoney & Lee, 2001, p. 387).
Questions about the health of water resources and the con-
sequent eﬀect on human health of the Mikisew Cree and Atha-
basca Chipewyan communities have drawn a great deal of
public and celebrity attention (Chen, 2009; Kelly et al.,
2009). As told by Dene elder Pat Marcel from Fort Chipew-
yan, ‘Oil sands development in the Athabasca region has
had devastating eﬀects on our people. We are afraid to drink
the water or eat the ﬁsh from the river as we have always done.
The ﬁsh have strange tumors, and cancer rates in our commu-
nity have increased dramatically in the last 10 years’ (Pat Mar-
cel, in Holroyd, 2008, p. 30).
Those less concerned with ecological impacts have argued
that there are other beneﬁts that more than oﬀset these envi-
ronmental disturbances and losses to the province’s stores of
natural capital. Is this plausible? Numerous approaches to
Figure 2. Community capitals framework: The framework developed here
was inspired by the work of Emery and Flora (2006); for simpliﬁcation,
however, the spheres of social, political and cultural capital deﬁned by Emery
and Flora (2006) are collapsed under the banner of social capital.
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have been undertaken – cost–beneﬁt modeling, input–output
formulas and ecological footprint analyses (Ness, Urbel-
Piirsalu, Anderberg, & Olsson, 2007; Thirwell, 2006). Sustain-
able development theory would assert that, at minimum, the
beneﬁts of any given development activity should outweigh
the environmental and socio-economic dis-beneﬁts (Thirwell,
2006). The ability of decision-makers to determine what con-
stitutes a signiﬁcant beneﬁt and/or cost however, is compli-
cated by the uncertainties surrounding the eﬀects and the
diverse perspectives and experiences of those aﬀected
(Walker et al., 2002). Beneﬁts and costs also tend to accrue
at diﬀerent scales. While concerns are growing about the con-
tributions of oil sands mining to the climate change problem,
First Nations living downstream of oil sands mining arguably
bear much of the environmental eﬀects. Beneﬁts (revenues)
tend to be captured provincially and federally, the trickle
down of these beneﬁts is perceived to be limited according
to statistics on income distribution. Statistics Canada data
show signiﬁcant disparities between Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal peoples, particularly in the resource rich
Regional Municipality of Wood Buﬀalo (Statistics Canada,
2006). There are also signiﬁcant environmental and
socio-cultural implications that ﬂy under the radar of eco-
nomic valuation (Timoney & Lee, 2001).
The resource curse has largely been theorized as an eco-
nomic phenomenon, but, it has much broader economic,
social, political, and cultural roots and implications (Auty,
2001). Macro-economic indicators oﬀer deﬁnitive symptoms,
however, a multifaceted conceptual lens, such as that oﬀered
by the community capitals framework (Emery & Flora,
2006), can help uncover its eﬀects at more reﬁned regional
and local scales (Emery & Flora, 2006).
The community capitals framework refers to the assets,
capabilities, and resources found within, and available to,
communities for achieving their development goals
(Bebbington, 1999; Sen, 1997). The capitals framework has
been theorized and applied to myriad issues of community
development (Bourdieu, 1986). ‘The proliferation of types of
‘capital’ – cultural capital, environmental capital, human cap-
ital, natural capital, social capital, etc. – that have been added
to the initial category of ﬁnancial capital reﬂects the growing
recognition of the complexity of economic growth’ (Corbett
& Swibold, 2002). What do these capitals really mean? Natural
capital is deﬁned here as those renewable and non-renewable
resources that produce economic opportunities and beneﬁts
including ﬁnancial capital. Human capital refers to the contri-
butions of individuals as well as the education, skills, and
knowledge acquired by individuals (and communities) includ-
ing that valued in the market place (e.g., electrician/trade cer-
tiﬁcate); it also includes the knowledge and skills valuable by
society but not priced in the market place (e.g., traditional eco-
logical knowledge of Indigenous peoples). Social capital refers
to the level of trust, civic commitment, and capacity for coop-
eration of a community or group (Lin, 2000) but in this paper,
is also inclusive of political and cultural capital.
A capitals framework provides the basis for thinking about
the eﬀects of the resource curse as well as the tools and capac-
ities for coping with these eﬀects (Figure 2). The framework
oﬀers opportunities to consider the kinds of issues being expe-
rienced within northern Alberta more holistically than might
otherwise be possible through one single disciplinary, theoret-
ical, or conceptual lens.
While well developed in the broader literature, the capitals
framework has not been used to study the resource curse phe-
nomenon to any signiﬁcant extent. But using this frameworkand drawing lessons from the broader literature, this paper
oﬀers insights into the kinds of barriers and opportunities to
economic development theorized to be present, and experi-
enced by, Indigenous communities and other communities fac-
ing the paradox of plenty (Anderson, 1999; Kendall, 2001;
Loxley, 2010).3. UNDERSTANDING THE RESOURCE CURSE IN
INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES
The resource curse concept is based on evidence of an
inverse relationship between resource abundance and poor
economic growth; the phenomenon was ﬁrst identiﬁed in
Africa and Latin America (Auty, 2001; Sachs & Warner,
1995; Wheeler, 1984). Since that time, symptoms and strate-
gies for managing the resource curse have been studied in Nor-
way and the United States (Table 1).
Evidence of the resource curse has also been growing in
Canada. Prior to the 2008–09 and most recent recessions,
Statistics Canada and economic policy experts were beginning
to point out possible symptoms of a resource curse tied to
booming oil sands mining (Bowlby, 2005). It was hypothesized
that Alberta, like other regions and countries rich in oil
resources, would have a higher propensity toward such prob-
lems as consumptive spending, rent-seeking behavior and
‘crowding out’ (Table 1). Low investment in research and
development and labor shortages in other sectors including
manufacturing were also noted (Emery and Flora, 2006).
Statistics Canada has also reported Alberta as having one of
the highest high school drop-out rates in the country at
25%, a trend attributed to the lure of high wages in the oil
and gas sector (Bowlby, 2005) (see Table 2).
Historically, Indigenous peoples in Canada were
self-determining peoples with their own economic traditions
(Corntassel, 2012; Frideres, 2000). However, Indigenous com-
munities are also part of a global political economy which has
signiﬁcantly eroded these traditions. While there are powerful
stories of political and economic resistance (Alfred, 2009),
Indigenous communities in Canada are also considered
Table 1. Symptoms of the resource curse
Mis-management of rents Resource extraction industries, particularly petroleum and mineral resources, are characterized as boom/bust industries due to the volatility of global
markets for those commodities. Research suggests that some resource curse problems are attributable to the apathy that comes of sudden wealth from
resource extraction. Governments may perceive a lesser need for sound economic management and institutional quality (Gylfason, 2001; Papyrakis &
Gerlagh, 2004; Sachs & Warner, 1995). Sudden increases in wealth can also lead to consumption rather than investment of resource rents at individual
and institutional levels. Speciﬁcally, there is a strong correlation between economic ‘booms’ or sudden increases in wealth and the following:
 Increased public spending (Ross, 1999)
 Ineﬃcient allocation of resources (Corden & Neary, 1982)
 Bad economic decision-making (Sachs & Warner, 2001)
 Rent-seeking behavior (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006; Olsson, 2003; Torvik, 2009)
Crowding out of other sectors/
weakening of human capital
The ‘crowding out’ eﬀect and the weakening of human capital is also symptomatic of the resource curse. The best example of crowding out was coined
the Dutch disease; a boom in Holland’s domestic revenue following the discovery of oﬀshore oil led to un-competitiveness in other sectors of the
economy particularly manufacturing. Inﬂation caused by large foreign exchange generated by exports was a key problem that went unaddressed by
the Dutch government
An associated problem in Holland and in other economies experiencing the resource curse is brain/skill drain. High wages oﬀered by resource sector
industries can serve to draw away scarce labor from other sectors of the economy, making it diﬃcult for them to compete. The same high wages can
create disincentives for education, entrepreneurship, and innovation in other sectors eﬀectively degrading the pool of human capital that may be
necessary to develop other sectors of the economy (Gylfason, 2001; Sachs & Warner, 2001)
Weakening of governing institutions
and social capital
Globalization critics including ‘dependency’ theorists have argued that the multi-national nature of resource extraction industries limits the capacity
of national and local scale governments to regulate and manage resource development for their own beneﬁt (Auty, 2001). The concern is that in boom
economies in which the majority of state revenues are captured from one industry, the nation-state becomes sub-servant to multi-national interests.
Scholar argue that the need for national autonomy in the face of globalization is underestimated, with geography and borders matter far more than is
generally assumed (Helliwell, 2002)
Resource rents ﬂowing out of the
community and region
Another symptom of the resource curse relates to the leakage of resource rents. Essentially economic growth is slow because revenues leave the
region/country rather than are reinvested in economic diversiﬁcation or social goods (Auty, 2001). In addition to its association with the resource
curse, the issue has been investigated in broader research on social and economic sustainability. Gaventa studied the eﬀect of absentee ownership on
well-being in communities in rural Appalachian, and found reduced well-being as a result of lack of access to land, lack of investment in human and
physical infrastructure, and lack of economic development opportunities (Gaventa, 1995)
Absentee owners are also suspected of holding less commitment to community sustainability than local owners (Freudenberg, 1992; Marchak, 1983).
This theory is not universal. Varghese et al. suggest that the link between ownership and community resiliency varies signiﬁcantly depending on the
composition (e.g., private vs. public; mill vs. forest license vs. coupled mill & forest license), type (social, cooperative, trust and/or direct-share
ownership), extent of ownership (percentage of local vs. extra-local shares), and the level of control (e.g., proportion of locally held seats on the Board
of Directors) associated with ownership (Varghese, Krogman, Beckley, & Nadeau, 2006)
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Table 2. High school dropout rates internationally (2002) and in Canada (2000–06)
United Kingdom Canada United States Germany France OECD-25 Italy
8 10.9 12.3 14.2 14.5 14.7 26.6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
CAN 11.7 11.3 11.1 10.9 10.4 10.1 9.5
NL 14.2 11.3 9.5 8.6 8.3 7.9 8.9
PE 11.5 11.9 11.2 11 10.5 9.7 8.9
NS 12.7 11.4 11.6 10.8 10.2 9.3 8.5
NB 10.2 10.4 10.3 9.8 8.8 9.2 9.5
QC 14.5 14.4 14.3 13.8 13 11.9 11.4
ON 9.7 9.1 9.1 9.4 9.2 9.1 8.4
MB 14.2 14.6 13.9 13 12.7 13 12.6
SK 12.5 12.1 11.4 10.9 10.7 10.7 10.2
AB 12.7 12.6 12.1 11.9 11.4 12 11.3
BC 9.8 9.4 9.2 8.6 8 7.5 7.4
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resource rich regions bear the greater burden of the adverse
socio-economic and ecological eﬀects of mineral production,
oil and gas exploration and development (Auty, 2001;
O’Faircheallaigh, 1998; O’Rourke & Connolly, 2003). There
is some evidence supporting this hypothesis in resource rich
areas of Canada. Gysbers and Lee argue that Indigenous com-
munities in forested regions of Canada experience poorer
socio-economic conditions than the nation as a whole includ-
ing lower incomes and rates of employment (Gysbers & Lee,
2003). A similar pattern also seems to exist at provincially.
Northern Alberta, which boasts one of the largest deposits
of oil in the world, is also home to some of the most impover-
ished Indigenous communities in the country. Signiﬁcant dis-
parities exist with respect to almost every social and
economic indicator (Aboriginal Aﬀairs and Northern
Development, 2003; Statistics Canada, 2006). Using four indi-
cators – educational attainment, employment, income, and
housing conditions, Statistics Canada reports that the
well-being of Indigenous communities in the prairie provinces
is in the bottom 1/3 percentage of the Indigenous population
as a whole. In addition, some of the highest disparities
between the well-being of non-Indigenous and Indigenous
people have been found in northern Alberta (Armstrong,
2001).
The ‘resource curse’ was ﬁrst coined to explain the uneven
patterns in economic growth among countries rich in natural
resources and those less endowed. Although narrowly deﬁned
by economic indicators (e.g., currency exchange rates), the
symptoms of the resource curse are more complex with many
socio-cultural and political dimensions (Table 1). To what
extent are Indigenous communities in northern Alberta more
susceptible to the symptoms of the resource curse than
non-Indigenous communities? What are the means by which
communities may be able to address resource curse eﬀects to
build more sustainable communities?
(a) Economic history of Indigenous communities in the oil sands
The present day economies of Indigenous communities in
northern Alberta have been shaped by both pre-colonial and
colonial histories (Coulthard, 2007; Frideres, 2000). Histori-
cally, the livelihoods of First Nations and Me´tis communities
in northern Alberta were oriented around subsistence harvest-
ing – hunting, ﬁshing, and the accumulative of forest resources
including berries and medicinal plants. The development of
the fur trade economy in western Canada including northern
Alberta, arguably transformed the relationship of First
Nations and Me´tis communities to the land and resources aswell a subsistence livelihoods. As noted by Tough (1996), the
fur trade economy was highly exploitive of the labor of Indige-
nous peoples who were often the victims of highly variable
prices of furs in the European market.
The HBC’s concept of proﬁt was based on an eﬀort to make proﬁt on
both sides of the exchange cycle; this included the pattern of buying
low and selling high when it came to fur prices as well as goods traded.
Under monopoly conditions, the Company could ‘whipsaw’ the Indian
trapper by reducing the buying price of furs and increasing the selling
price of trade goods. Innis argued that the HBC could protect itself
from a fall in prices because “the Company must take a wide margin
on the price of the goods (Tough, 1996, p. 268).
By the end of the fur trade, the eﬀects of such economic
exploitation were widespread with varying degrees of conse-
quence. But the situation was not one-dimensional: there
was signiﬁcant variation in contact experiences. ‘Indigenous
people with widely varying histories, economies and cultures
had quite diﬀerent responses to the strangers in their midst,
including accommodation’ (Carter, 1999, p. 35). The economic
vulnerability caused by decades of trade as well as alienation
and exploitation of other resources including ﬁsh, forests,
and minerals facilitated by the Treaty process, compounded
the health consequences of diseases such as small pox, tuber-
culosis, and inﬂuenza (Waldram, Ann Herring, & Kue
Young, 2006). By the late 1800s, many scholars including his-
torians described Indigenous people as almost completely dis-
enfranchised from the emerging mainstream economy of
western Canada. Indigenous people were viewed, not as allies
in frontier development, but as a ‘problem’ to be mitigated or
addressed.
I want to get rid of the Indian problem. Our objective is to continue
until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed
(Duncan Campbell Scott, Superintendent-General of Indian Aﬀairs,
1920; cited in (Moﬀat & Herring, 1999, p. 114).
Strategies at assimilation, such as the residential school sys-
tem, were developed by the federal governments of the time to
rid the country of the ‘Indian problem’ (Moﬀat & Herring,
1999, p. 114). By the 1960s, however, it was clear that assim-
ilationist approaches were not a viable solution to the growing
poverty on reserves, particularly for communities in northern
regions of the province. The Federal government began
encouraging Indigenous peoples to leave their remote commu-
nities and land-based lifestyles and move to cities (Hawthorn,
Cairns, & Tremblay, 1967). On the whole, communities did
not beneﬁt to any great extent from these economic develop-
ment strategies. The eﬀorts, however, well intentioned, had
many negative consequences. The social and cultural costs of
the residential school system have been grave (RCAP, 1993).
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ment was the strategy that came into vogue in the 1970s, how-
ever, lack of viable markets, inadequate infrastructure, and the
small size and remoteness of many Indigenous communities
were major impediments to the success of this strategy
(Saku, 2002). Attention eventually turned to human resource
development; resources were allocated to education at the pri-
mary and secondary level as a means of developing knowledge
and skills for wage employment and business development.
This approach was relatively successful when compared to ear-
lier programs (Saku, 2002). The eﬀort increased rates of com-
pletion of high school and post secondary school during 1981–
99 from 41% to 55% (McCallum, 1999).
By the 1980s, policy makers began to recognize the need to
address a broader set of socio-cultural (and environmental fac-
tors) at the same time as economic goals in order to achieve
sustainable economic development. Today Indigenous com-
munities are encouraged to hitch their economic development
futures to the boom in the petroleum sector. Government
leaders, policy analysts, and some Indigenous leaders tout it
as a panacea out of poverty. But how viable is this approach
to economic sustainability for Indigenous communities? It is
in this context that we return to the question of the resource
curse.
(b) Natural capital and Indigenous rights to lands and resources
in Alberta
Large-scale resource extraction activities are often approved
on the assumption that the public will beneﬁt from the eco-
nomic activity – governments attempt to capture rents that
facilitate ‘development’ or improved quality of life. For
Indigenous communities, one of the keys to leveraging such
rents is the recognition by industry, the province and federal
government of their rights to capture economic beneﬁts from
the lands and resources around them. These rights have been
analyzed as fundamental to Indigenous livelihoods and con-
ceptualized here as one of the ‘capitals’ needed to achieve eco-
nomic development outcomes (Anderson, Dana, & Dana,
2006, p. 47).
‘Aboriginal rights’ to lands and resources are deﬁned and
protected within Treaty and the Canadian Constitution
(1989). However, given that Indigenous communities were sys-
tematically marginalized through European settlement, their
‘rights’ to lands and resources are complex and contested
arrangements (Ross, 1999). The greatest contest has been
between First Nations and the Government of Alberta. The
Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930) transferred ‘au-
thority’ over natural resources from the federal to provincial
governments. In opposition to Treaty #8 (1899) signed with
First Nations of the region and the state, the NRTA states
that: ‘only the Alberta government has a legal right of owner-
ship and management of provincial lands and resources’
(Government of Alberta – Aboriginal Aﬀairs and Northern
Development, 2001). Currently, the province enjoys: broad
discretionary powers in allocating rights to access and use of
public lands and natural resources (Kennett & Ross, 1998).
Alberta’s provincial legislation provides no real guidance on
if or how to acknowledge and protect treaty rights. Any pro-
tection of Aboriginal rights in the resource development con-
text ‘often results indirectly from provisions that are designed
to minimize environmental impacts during the development
process’ (Ross, 1999, p. 21). Further evidence of the province’s
lack of consideration of Indigenous land interests can be
found in the 2003 Amendment to the Public Lands Act. This
amendment further entrenched the rights of corporations topublic lands by limiting access of Indigenous peoples and
others to roads and other resource corridors; it essentially cre-
ated a system of ‘open access’ to crown lands in which Indige-
nous peoples have become marginalized (Ross, 1999).
This conﬂict between Indigenous rights and the eﬀorts of the
state to develop First Nation and Me´tis lands have consis-
tently been ﬂagged by the Canadian courts. In Alberta,
provincial government and industry interests have systemati-
cally disregarded or opposed eﬀorts of First Nations and
Me´tis to exercise Treaty and constitutional rights. The situa-
tion of the Lubicon Cree First Nation is perhaps the most
public case of land dispossession becoming a human rights
case considered by the United Nations Human Rights Tri-
bunal (Huﬀ, 1999). As noted by Goddard, the Lubicon case
is demonstrative of ‘what can happen when an [Indigenous]
community tries to assert its rights to a territory rich in oil’
(Goddard, 1991, p. 6). Faced with almost insurmountable bar-
riers to land claims in Alberta, First Nations and Me´tis have
thus turned to other legal, political, and social mechanisms
to meet their political and economic interests (Parlee,
Goddard, Łutse¨l K’e´ Dene First Nation, & Smith, 2014).
Legal requirements to ‘consult’ now oﬀer some opportuni-
ties to inﬂuence both government and industry. Supreme
Court rulings such as Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
(1997), Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of
Forests) (2004), and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v.
British Columbia (2004), and Mikisew v. Crown have also cre-
ated a range of obligations and requirements for consultation
and the involvement of Indigenous people in resource manage-
ment decision-making. Although there is currently no
province-wide consultation policy or set of guidelines, consul-
tation (which occurs under through the environmental assess-
ment process in accordance with the Environmental Protection
and Enhancement Act as well as community-speciﬁc consulta-
tion processes) have enabled Indigenous communities in
Alberta to inﬂuence development to some extent – ensure their
rights to resources are respected. 1 But as noted by some schol-
ars, the current process of consultation remains relatively inef-
fective at protecting the rights and interests of Indigenous
peoples in Alberta (Passelac-Ross & Potes, 2007; Sharvit,
Robinson, & Ross, 1999). Although sitting on lands and
resources of signiﬁcant economic value, Indigenous communi-
ties in northern Alberta thus have limited means to develop
those resources in ways that create or sustain their economic
futures.
(c) Managing community revenues from resource development:
ﬁnancial capital
Despite the complexity and conﬂict over land and resource
rights, some First Nations and Me´tis communities have been
able to garner revenues from petroleum exploration and devel-
opment on their traditional lands through agreements with
industry. Many such arrangements have come about, not as
a result of the benevolence of government, but through litiga-
tion of threatened litigation on the part of First Nations
(Passelac-Ross & Potes, 2007). Such revenues are not, how-
ever, an absolute assurance of economic growth or ‘develop-
ment’.
Empirical study of natural resource development economies
reveal a consistent problem in the management of resource
rents including ineﬃcient management and allocation of
resources (Corden & Neary, 1982), bad economic
decision-making (Sachs & Warner, 2001), rent-seeking behav-
ior or corruptive economic practices (Baland & Francois,
2000; Krueger, 1974; Olsson, 2003; Torvik, 2009) and unsus-
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attribute this systemic problem of bad governance to a kind
of apathy or a false sense of security about the sustainability
of the economy that can come with the sudden increases in
wealth. Such issues of governance are not only apparent at a
national level. Regional and community governments are also
guilty of this kind of mis-management and rent-seeking behav-
ior. ‘There is a growing recognition that the payment of roy-
alties to incorporated bodies in areas aﬀected by mining can
result in excessive regional politicking for these moneys, with
a concomitant lack of attention to longer-term economic
opportunities and an inability to accumulate venture capital
for investment’ (Altman, 1996, p. 298).
What is the solution? Research with Indigenous communi-
ties in Australia, Canada, and Alaska point to some key tools
and mechanisms for capturing and sustaining beneﬁts from
these kinds of economic rents. These include: informal
resource-sharing arrangements, impact and beneﬁt agree-
ments, and business contracts with community organizations
or corporations. How do these revenues translate as beneﬁts?
In some cases, revenues are allocated out on a per capita basis
to individuals recognized as having legal rights. In other inci-
dences communities withhold all or a percentage of revenues
for re-investment in the community programs, events, or
infrastructure. Trust funds are a common model in some case
studies. ‘The Alaskan oil fund, with quarterly payment of the
dividends to all Alaskans, seems to be one of the most trans-
parent and eﬀective arrangements for these funds. The Kirib-
ati trust fund, built up earlier from phosphate mining revenues
and more recently from ﬁshing license fees, and under direct
government control, has been well-invested and continues to
grow’ (Duncan, 2003, p. 320).
Regardless of the mechanism of revenue sharing, there are
concerns about how such revenues inﬂuence the course of
development of speciﬁc communities. ‘The ability of local peo-
ple, particularly Indigenous people, to bargain eﬀectively and
protect their social and cultural autonomy in a corporate
framework is a strategic dimension of community change
and a necessary focus of social assessments of change’ (Lane
& Rickson, 1997, p. 125). Inequities of power in the relation-
ships between Indigenous people, governments, and corpora-
tions stemming from histories of exploitation and
dependency aﬀect the ability of Indigenous communities to
eﬀectively negotiate (Snipp, 1986).
What constitutes an eﬀective revenue-sharing arrangement
is also not well understood beyond the experience of individ-
ual communities. Greater consideration is needed on how
‘processes and relationships constructed at one scale interpen-
etrate and are interpenetrated by those constructed and man-
ifested at other scales’ (Howitt, 2002, p. 137).
Commitment and good faith on the part of both the com-
munity and the corporation in negotiating revenue-sharing
arrangements or contracts is critical from an economic devel-
opment standpoint. Conﬂicts often create uncertainties that
can lead to reduced interest in exploration and development
and reduced investment. In the Australia context for example,
disputes between Indigenous peoples and corporations are
common, a problem that Duncan attributes to an ‘asymmetry
of information between developers and the mining companies,
the time inconsistency of contracts, and the incompleteness of
contracts’ (Duncan, 2003, p. 318). What is required is better
design of contracts to ensure security for companies and ben-
eﬁts for communities including better revenue-sharing
arrangements (Duncan & Duncan, 1997). In Australia, Indige-
nous communities identiﬁed the need for better models on
which to develop contracts. ‘Avoiding such ‘rent-seeking’behavior and ensuring that mineral discoveries make the best
possible contribution to the welfare of [Indigenous] communi-
ties involves negotiating eﬀective contracts with mining com-
panies and the eﬀective management of the share of mining
revenues accruing to the communities’ (Duncan, 2003, p.
318). More research is needed on the institutional arrange-
ments and systems of governance that work in Indigenous
communities and will ensure governing elite manage funds in
the best interests of beneﬁciaries.
(d) Avoiding the brain drain: the importance of human capital
Of the most enticing promises of petroleum resource sector
to Indigenous communities is the promise of employment. For
those living on the socio-economic margins, the possibility of
high wages in the oil and gas sector has been particularly sig-
niﬁcant in drawing support and participation of northern
Alberta’s Indigenous communities. This is no surprise. Unem-
ployment levels in Indigenous communities are signiﬁcantly
higher than in other communities in northern Alberta includ-
ing the Regional Municipality of Wood Buﬀalo. The unem-
ployment rate in communities closest to Fort McMurray
ranges between 11% and 33% (Statistics Canada, 2006). In
some communities, the unemployment rate can be as high as
82% – extreme when compared with the 4–5% unemployment
rate calculated for this Alberta region deﬁned as Wood Buf-
falo/Cold Lake (Government of Alberta, 2010; 2014).
Indigenous communities have historically been conceptual-
ized as a mixed economy in which both the formal and infor-
mal economy are interrelated (Abele, 1989; Usher, Duhaime,
& Searles, 2003). Individuals and households in such an econ-
omy have knowledge and skills relevant for both wage
employment in the petroleum sector and for ‘traditional’
forms of work including subsistence harvesting (Wilson &
Rosenberg, 2002).
Although there is a trend toward greater employment in a
wage economy, the informal economy in many northern
Alberta communities continues to persist; it may indeed be
serving to oﬀset some of the symptoms of a resource curse.
As the beneﬁts of the formal economy ﬂuctuate, individuals
and households rely more or less on the traditional economic
sector. ‘Subsistence in a mixed economy acts like a sponge,
absorbing labor when other opportunities decline and releas-
ing it when they arise’ (Usher et al., 2003, p. 178).
Some policy analysts suggest that employment in the petro-
leum sector is the big ticket out of the poverty trap for Indige-
nous peoples (Bains, 2013). Employment of Indigenous
peoples in the mineral/petroleum sector in northern Alberta
and Canada has remained relatively steady in the past decade
(2007–12) at 5%, however, there are concomitant eﬀorts to
increase this margin (Government of Canada, 2013).
Over-emphasis on employment in petroleum sector, while cre-
ating short-term individual beneﬁts, can have medium
long-term adverse eﬀects. In many resource curse economies,
the draw of higher wages in the resource sector, particularly
the oil and gas sector, can precipitate a skill and brain drain
or skill drain away from other sectors of the economy
(Table 1). The need for unskilled labor or semi-skilled labor
also serves as a disincentive to higher education, training
and entrepreneurship (Cohn & Addison, 1998).
Is this a major concern given the high levels of unemploy-
ment that exist in many First Nations and Me´tis communities?
A brain/skill drain issue may not be a problem, if individuals
were indeed moving in a black and white fashion from an
absolute state of unemployment or low employment to one
of full employment. But often those most likely to be success-
432 WORLD DEVELOPMENTful in achieving employment outside their community are
those already skilled and gainfully employed. As such the
unemployment rate may not decline as employment in the pet-
roleum sector increases, but communities may be facing short-
ages in skilled and knowledgeable workers in key areas of the
local economy.
As such increasing wage employment in the petroleum sec-
tor many not be resulting in any real development or advance
in human capital for the community or region – especially if
positions are for unskilled labor. The draw of high wages in
the unskilled wage sector, is seen as exacerbating an already
existing problem of low educational attainment across the pro-
vince and in Indigenous communities (Mendelson, 2006) (see
Table 3).
Why is educational attainment so low? The intergenera-
tional trauma that has resulted from the residential school sys-
tem in Canada, coupled with lack of culturally appropriate
curricula can explain much of the present statistics. The lack
of role models in professional positions is also thought to
exacerbate the lack of interest and trust of Indigenous peoples
in education and training as a means of development (Tanner,
Krahn, & Hartnagel, 1995). This is not uncommon in other
parts of Canada and similar economic contexts of Australia.
In an Australian study on attitudes toward higher education,
those students from low socio-economic backgrounds were
less likely to perceive university as important, perceived lim-
ited parental support of higher education, and anticipated
more barriers to achieving a university education (James,
2003). Given such low educational attainment trends, Indige-
nous communities will tend to feel the losses associated with
a brain/skill drain more acutely.
To address this problem, some communities have attempted
to build a more ﬁxed link between education and wage beneﬁts
through ﬁrm-speciﬁc training. While this appears to have been
eﬀective in creating employment and addressing labor short-
ages in the short term, emphasis on ﬁrm-speciﬁc training over
the long term may perpetuate a resource curse problem by cre-
ating over-dependency on a single industry; or in other words,
limit the capacity of individuals and communities to adapt to
other economic development opportunities (Middleton, 1993;
Ziderman & Horn, 1995).
(e) The importance of social capital in coping with the resource
curse
Social capital has been theorized as important to communi-
ties coping with the ups and downs of economic opportunity,
environmental hazards (such as climate change), alleviating
poverty, and achieving food security (Portes, 1998). While
not a panacea, it may also be valuable for those coping with
the regional eﬀects of the resource curse.
Early references to social capital can be found in the work of
Coleman and other sociologists who observed that individuals
draw on the collective resources of groups in addition to tra-
ditional forms of economic capital (physical, human, and nat-Table 3. Percentage of Canadian aboriginal people
Aborigi
Less than high school graduation certiﬁcate
High school graduation certiﬁcate only
Trades certiﬁcate
College certiﬁcate
University certiﬁcate
University degreeural) to address their individual needs and interests (Portes,
1998). Putnam deﬁned social capital as ‘features of social orga-
nization, such as networks, norms and social trust, that facil-
itate coordination and cooperation for mutual beneﬁt’
(Putnam, 1995, p. 67). It diﬀers from other forms of capital
discussed above in its relative intangibility, ‘for it exists in
the relations among people’ (Coleman, 1988, p. S101). Numer-
ous scholars have evolved the concept, demonstrating that
without adequate forms of social capital, individuals and com-
munities may be unable to develop other forms of capital (e.g.,
human capital, eﬀective) and may be limited in their ability to
achieve critical goals such as cultural sustainability, political
eﬃcacy, and economic development (Portes, 1998).
The intangibility of social capital makes it diﬃcult to assess
and measure. Mignone and O’Neil suggest that social capital
in the First Nation context can be measured by the degree that
its resources are socially invested; that it presents a culture of
trust, norms of reciprocity, collective action, and participa-
tion; and that it possesses inclusive, ﬂexible, and diverse net-
works (Mignone & O’Neil, 2005). Other attributes of social
capital may be visible in social indicators research or that
related to well-being. Parlee et al. provides a model of Dene
health and well-being with indicators revolving around the
community’s capacity for self-government, healing, and cul-
tural preservation (Parlee, O’Neil, & Lutsel K’e Dene First
Nation, 2007). Social capital of a bonding nature is closely
reﬂected in such indicators as intergenerational knowledge
sharing (elders sharing knowledge with youth) family cohesion
(parents supporting youth); volunteerism, civic participation
(participation in public meetings), social interaction and com-
munication, demonstration of traditional values (respect for
the land); and participation in cultural events such as caribou
hunting and spiritual gatherings (Parlee et al., 2007).
Many aspects of social capital are grounded in the cultural
traditions and subsistence economies of Indigenous communi-
ties (Usher et al., 2003); the associated knowledge, practices,
and institutions might equally be framed as cultural capital
(Berkes & Folke, 1994). As Duhaime and others have noted,
subsistence does not simply involve hunting, ﬁshing, and other
food gathering activities; ‘. . .it is a powerful ideology that
extends into other areas of life including raising of children,
and the treatment of elders. It also contributes to the structure
of social relations, community leadership and moral authority’
(Duhaime, Searles, Usher, Myers, & Frechette, 2004). As com-
munities become more involved in other kinds of economic
activity, there are real risks that the social norms that ensured
the well-being of communities become eroded. Finding ways
to maintain or build upon the social capital associated with
subsistence economies in emerging resource development
economies will create opportunities for real economic oppor-
tunity and beneﬁt. The lack of continuity in social norms, or
the disruption of social systems, may greatly limit the continu-
ity of identity and community known to be protective of many
aspects of community health and well-being (Chandler &
Lalonde, 1998).in post secondary education (Mendelson, 2006)
nal identity (%) Total Canadian population (%)
48 31.3
9.9 14.1
12.1 10.9
11.6 15.0
1.4 2.5
4.4 15.4
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ideological mooring where the collective imagination can anchor and
elaborate a concrete identity, even if invented, even if tainted by bor-
rowing from the very culture it claims to oppose politically, constitutes
the impregnable rock on which Indigenous peoples lay their claim,
mobilize themselves and express their desire to gain autonomous con-
trol of their collective destiny (Sale´e, 1995, p. 293).
There are diﬀerent forms of social capital that may help
address the resource curse problem; these can be classiﬁed as
bonding and bridging social capital. The former refers to the
value assigned to social networks between homogeneous
groups of people and the latter to that of social networks
between socially heterogeneous groups.
Identifying ways to link exclusive forms of indigenous social capital to
more inclusive forms of social capital that integrate families, communi-
ties and nations into global economy is a core problem of our age. . .
this can be seen as a need to ﬁnd ways to connect traditional forms
of bonding social capital to new forms of bridging social capital”
(O’Brien, Phillips, & Patsiorkovsky, 2005, p. 1041
Those communities with strong social capital of a bonding
nature may have a greater capacity to oﬀset socio-economic
inequities associated with the resource curse. Furthermore,
those communities able to build social capital outside of their
own communities to other locales may be less vulnerable to
external pressures from government or industry and may be
able to take advantage of new opportunities and innovations
(Woolcock, 2001, p. 12).
Many economists are now recognizing the value of social
capital as a factor in the management of natural resources
(Pretty, 2003) and as a precursor to economic development
(Casey & Christ, 2005; Light & Dana, 2013). How does this
work?
The implied causal chain starts with membership in civic and social
organizations, creating generalized bonds of trust within a community.
These in turn serve to lower economic risk and reduce transaction costs
(by increasing the ‘social costs’ of malfeasance and free riding), which
facilitates the dissemination of organizational and technical knowl-
edge, enhancing both economic and governmental eﬃciency and, ﬁnal-
ly, enhancing community prosperity (Casey & Christ, 2005, p. 828).
The value of social capital as an indicator of economic
growth is not, however, universal. Miguel et al. studied social
capital indicators across 274 Indonesian states and found no
correlation with economic development outcomes from indus-
trial activity (Miguel, Gertler, & Levine, 2005).
Indigenous communities in northern Alberta have
well-developed forms of social capital that have enabled them
to cope with an inordinate degree of social change in their
communities over the last half century; examples of endoge-
nous forms of social capital arguably including cultural and
oral traditions and practices for hunting, trapping, and ﬁshing
which still continue despite the encroachment and eﬀects of
resource development (McCormack, 2010). Food-sharing net-
works as well as other social supports (e.g., traditional health
care and healing practices) have also provided strength in fac-
ing a growing list of environmental changes, human health
problems which are attributed to oil sands activity including
increased cancer rates (Chen, 2009; Kelly et al., 2009). Despite
being a small community, Mikisew Cree First Nation and
Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation have been successful in
building other forms of social capital outside their community.
Evidence of bridging social capital at work can be found in
the social relations between, built by and with the Indigenous
community of Fort Chipewyan in northern Alberta, environ-
mental organizations and other governments outside of
Canada. Speciﬁcally, the community has seemingly been able
to educate and build social capital to help address the negativeexperiences with oil sands development. Media releases
(involving celebrities) and ﬁlms, such as ‘Dirty Oil’ and
‘H2Oil’ have been part of that eﬀort. Other formal lobbying
in international forums has also been important. In 2005, lead-
ers from Fort Chipeywan traveled to Geneva to make a pre-
sentation before the United Nations on Human Rights and
Climate Change. The use of media to inﬂuence the imaging
of oil sands and its eﬀects has been highly eﬀective in building
social capital outside of Alberta and Canada. ‘Save Fort Chi-
pewyan’ campaigns have seemingly emerged in many parts of
the globe – from Germany to Japan. What will be the net eﬀect
or value of such social capital? Further research is needed to
explore the ways in which Indigenous communities may be
better oﬀ as a result of these linkages established within and
outside of their community. While not a panacea for address-
ing the resource curse, social capital may provide some key
resources needed for coping with many of the oil sands eﬀects
and may also serve as a point of leverage for building other
kinds of capitals (discussed earlier) needed to achieve greater
beneﬁts and mitigate eﬀects.4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Large-scale natural resource development poses both oppor-
tunities and challenges for Indigenous communities including
those living in northern Alberta, Canada. A rich endowment
of natural resources in the region would suggest that economic
growth is guaranteed, yet socio-economic statistics, as well as
Aboriginal leaders, tell a much diﬀerent story. Many Indige-
nous communities in Alberta suﬀer disproportionately from
the adverse socio-economic and ecological implications of
resource development and see few socio-economic beneﬁts
(Anderson, 1999; Armstrong, 2001; Kendall, 2001; Loxley,
2010). The paradoxical slow pace of economic growth in a
region, so rich in natural resources, may be considered a regio-
nal example of the resource curse (Kangning & Jian, 2005;
Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2007). This paper considered to what
extent Indigenous communities have the means to cope and
adapt to the regional and local eﬀects of resource curse in ways
that ensure beneﬁts and minimize disbeneﬁts. While the
socio-economic equity and development challenges in Alberta
cannot be absolutely labeled a resource curse problem, the
analysis and framework oﬀered here might nonetheless be use-
ful in thinking about the broader social-economic, cultural,
and political dimensions of this economic phenomenon. Using
a community capitals framework that features natural, ﬁnan-
cial, human and social capital, the paper considered these
other dimensions in a manner meant to highlight how commu-
nities might be better oﬀ despite the ‘development’ occurring
in their regions.
The paradox of plenty evidenced in Alberta is arguably dee-
ply rooted in colonial histories of land and resource disposses-
sion (e.g., forced resettlement of Indigenous peoples to
marginal reserve land) (Frideres, 2000). As a result many First
Nations and Me´tis communities are without the natural capi-
tal (land and resources) needed for sustainable livelihoods.
However, with the recognition of Aboriginal rights in the
Canadian constitution and ﬁduciary obligations to consult,
there are emerging opportunities for communities to leverage
their legal rights and interests to achieve greater economic
opportunities. Best practices for accessing such economic ben-
eﬁts at the regional or community level (e.g., revenue-sharing
arrangements) are not well established; nor is it clear how and
to what extent, the increase in revenues are currently translat-
ing into improvements in the quality of life, well-being, or sus-
434 WORLD DEVELOPMENTtainability of communities. Eﬀorts to capture beneﬁts through
increased training and employment in the petroleum sector,
while considered a panacea by some policy analysts, may carry
risks synonymous with the resource curse. Brain/skill drain is
a real issue for communities unable to compete with high
wages in the petroleum sector.
On the whole, Indigenous communities in northern Alberta,
as elsewhere in Canada, are marginalized in their access to nat-
ural, ﬁnancial, and human capital; recognizing that the avail-
ability of and access to these forms of capital are
interconnected with the resource curse phenomenon (e.g.,
Table 1), one might argue that as resource development con-
tinues, the eﬀect of the resource curse will worsen, with Indige-
nous communities having fewer and fewer resources and assets
on which to draw to cope with its eﬀects.
In that context, social capital may be the most critical form
of capital; there is evidence that some Indigenous communities
have been highly eﬀective at developing both bonding and
bridging forms of social capital and that these social, political,
and cultural resources are important to may aspects of liveli-
hood and well-being. There is also the potential that social
capital can help address losses of other forms of capital. For
example, social movements involving organization of commu-
nity groups in Fort Chipeywan with environmental organiza-
tions in other parts of North America and Europe, have
placed pressures on provincial and federal governments to
address gaps in their environmental monitoring programs
including lack of traditional knowledge.
The question of whether such social capital has developed
(and can continue to ﬂourish) in spite of, or because of the
marginality of Indigenous peoples in mainstream develop-
ment, is an important one moving forward. While some
research indicates that the availability of social capital and
its value in achieving development goals hinges on the support
of the state (Skocpol, 1996; Tendler, 1997), this may not be
true in this Canadian context. Indigenous scholars in Canada
and elsewhere have indeed argued and evidenced that depen-
dence on the state has done more to erode social and culturaltraditions of social and economic organization in Indigenous
communities and it is only by resisting engagement with the
state that Indigenous communities can move forward and
achieve economic self-suﬃciency and self-determination
(Alfred, 2009; Corntassel, 2012). Others have argued that the
withdrawl of the state and the creation of more neoliberal
approaches to economic development can create greater
opportunities for Indigenous engagement in mainstream soci-
ety (Flanagan, 2008; Slowey, 2008).
The petroleum sector in northern Alberta is expanding at a
pace and scale not previously seen in Canada or globally. The
‘oil sands’ is now the largest industrial project on the globe
with millions of dollars being generated annually for provin-
cial and federal governments. As oil sands mining continues,
the relative poverty being experienced by Indigenous commu-
nities in this regional context becomes even more apparent.
The persistence of such poverty amidst plenty precipitated this
research on the ‘resource curse’ and consideration of the rele-
vance of this theory to the regional context of northern
Alberta. This paper has demonstrated that symptoms of the
resource curse are present in northern Alberta and felt acutely
by Indigenous communities. At the same time there are oppor-
tunities to address these symptoms such that Indigenous com-
munities can be better oﬀ as a result of the oil sands boom. The
paper does not attempt to prescribe a course for development
but rather has sought to understand why some communities
may be better able to achieve beneﬁts from a booming natural
resource economy and others do not. Access to diﬀerent forms
of natural, human, ﬁnancial, and social capital suggests a
typology for thinking about what resources and capacities
are available to communities coping with the stresses of
resource curse eﬀects in their regions. While arguments have
been made through other global case studies, that social cap-
ital matters to the livelihoods of Indigenous communities, this
paper advances our understanding of the similarities between
these case studies and the experiences of Indigenous peoples
in Canada and the signiﬁcance of social capital to sustainable
resource development.NOTES1. Under the Environmental Protection Timber Harvest Planning and
Operating Ground Rules, there are also ‘Procedural requirements’ to
inform individuals with trapping licenses who may be aﬀected by resourcedevelopment activities. It is important to note however, that this
requirement is based on the trapping license and not treaty rights (Ross,
2003, p. 24).
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